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When the 4-state or the 6-state protocol of quantum cryp-
tography is carried out on a noisy (i.e. realistic) quantum
channel, then the raw key has to be processed to reduce the
information of an adversary Eve down to an arbitrarily low
value, providing Alice and Bob with a secret key. In princi-
ple, quantum algorithms as well as classical algorithms can be
used for this processing. A natural question is: up to which
error rate on the raw key is a secret-key agreement at all
possible? Under the assumption of incoherent eavesdropping,
we find that the quantum and classical limits are precisely
the same: as long as Alice and Bob share some entanglement
both quantum and classical protocols provide secret keys.
Quantum cryptography lies at the intersection of two
of the major sciences of the 20th century: quantum me-
chanics and information theory. Moreover, due to the
intimate relation between quantum cryptography and
quantum non-locality, another major scientific achieve-
ment of this century, relativity, is not far away. This let-
ter concerns the dialog between quantum physics and in-
formation theory in the context of optimal eavesdropping
on a quantum channel and the corresponding secret-key
agreement that, in principle, both quantum and classi-
cal algorithms provide. This analysis of the interplay of
these complementary approaches reveals surprising con-
nections.
To provide a secure communication, quantum cryp-
tography [1] exploits quantum correlations to estab-
lish secure keys (which are then the basis for standard
information-based cryptosystems). Alice prepares a pair
of qubits (i.e. a pair of spin 12 ) in a maximally entangled
state, sends one qubit to Bob and keeps the other one.
Then they both measure their qubit in a basis chosen in-
dependently at random within a set of 2 or 3 bases for the
4- and 6-state protocols, respectively. (Alice could also
prepare a qubit in a state compatible with one of the
bases and send it to Bob, but the protocol with qubit
pairs is equivalent and better suited for the purpose of
this letter). On a perfect channel the correlations are
maximal and the protocol is straightforward, the secure
key results essentially without any information theoreti-
cal algorithm. However, in practice the quantum chan-
nel is noisy and elaborated protocols are needed. These
require as input an upper bound on the information ac-
cessible to the eavesdropper, a bound set by the laws of
quantum physics. Natural questions are: up to which
error rate is secure key agreement at all possible? This
letter presents the answer to this question under the as-
sumption of incoherent eavesdropping.
Below, we first review general incoherent eavesdrop-
ping and summarize recent results on secret-key agree-
ment by public discussion. Then, the cases that Bob has
more or less information than Eve are treated.
By general incoherent eavesdropping we mean the fol-
lowing. First, Eve lets each qubit sent by Alice to Bob
interact with independent ancillas. The dimension of the
ancillas and the interaction are arbitrary, except that the
interaction is described by a unitary operator U :
U | ↑ 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 =
√
F| ↑ 〉 ⊗ ψ↑ +
√
D| ↓ 〉 ⊗ φ↑ (1)
U | ↓ 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 =
√
F| ↓ 〉 ⊗ ψ↓ +
√
D| ↑ 〉 ⊗ φ↓ (2)
where the ψj and φj are the normalized states of Eve’s
ancilla when Bob receives the qubit undisturbed and dis-
turbed, respectively. The former case happens with prob-
ability F , called the fidelity, and the latter with probabil-
ity D, called the disturbance or, equivalently, the Quan-
tum Bit Error Rate (QBER). Next, Eve stores her ancil-
las until she learns the bases used by Alice to encode the
qubits. Finally, she measures her ancillas one after the
other, using any measurement scheme compatible with
the laws of quantum physics. Clearly, if Eve interacts
only weakly with the qubits, then she disturbs the chan-
nel only weakly, hence the QBER is low, but Eve gets
little information. On the contrary, if the interaction is
strong, Eve gains more information, but the QBER is
larger. Optimal here means that for any given QBER,
Eve chooses the qubit-ancilla interaction and her mea-
surement to maximize her information. The QBER can
be well estimated by Alice and Bob by comparing a frac-
tion of their (classical) bits. From this and from the laws
of quantum physics they can bound Eve’s information.
The state vectors ψj and φj in (1, 2) have to be such
that they define a unitary operator U . Moreover, we
choose them such that U has the same effect on all qubits
sent by Alice (all the Poincare´ vectors are shrunk by the
same factor). This is called symmetric eavesdropping.
It simplifies the analysis considerably. It is important
to note that one can assume symmetric eavesdropping
without loss of generality, as proven in [2,3]. Indeed,
Eve can make her strategy look symmetric to Bob by
applying arbitrary rotations R to the qubit immediately
before and R−1 immediately after it interacts with her
1
ancilla. As she knows which rotation she applies, she
does not lose information. From Bob’s point of view,
however, the arbitrary rotations make the disturbance
appear symmetric. From this symmetry condition one
obtains the following relation for the fidelity F [2–4]:
F = 1 + 〈φ↑|φ↓〉
2− 〈ψ↑|ψ↓〉+ 〈φ↑|φ↓〉 (3)
The explicit form of the ψj and φj and Eve’s optimal
measurements are given in [2,3] for the 4-state protocol
(BB84) and in [4,5] for the 6-state protocol (note that for
the latter 〈φ↑|φ↓〉 = 0). This provides the joint probabil-
ity distribution PXY Z of the random variables X , Y , and
Z to which Alice, Bob, and Eve have access, respectively.
It turns out that Eve’s random variable is composed of
2 bits Z = [Z1, Z2], where Z1 = X ⊕ Y (⊕=xor), i.e.,
Z1 tells Eve whether Bob received the qubit disturbed
(Z1 = 1) or not (Z1 = 0) (this is a consequence of the fact
that the ψ and φ states in (1,2) generate orthogonal sub-
spaces). The probability that Eve’s second bit indicates
the correct value of Bob’s bit depends on whether the
qubit was disturbed or not: Prob(Z2 = Y |X = Y ) = δ0
and Prob(Z2 = Y |X 6= Y ) = δ1 (note that for the 6-state
protocol δ1 = 1). The relevant Shannon informations are
then:
IBob = 1 + F log2(F) + (1−F) log2(1−F) (4)
IEve = F (1 + δ0 log2(δ0) + (1− δ0) log2(1− δ0)) (5)
+ (1−F) (1 + δ1 log2(δ1) + (1− δ1) log2(1− δ1))
For the 4-state protocol Eve’s Shannon information is
maximal when δ0 = δ1 =
1
2 +
√
F(1−F). Let us con-
centrate on the point where IBob = IEve, at QBER0 =
1−F0 = 1−1/
√
2
2 . For QBERs below this threshold, Bob
has more information than Eve, while above QBER0 Bob
has less information than Eve. We shall see that in the
latter case Alice and Bob can still exploit their authenti-
cated classical communication channel to overcome their
initial drawback. Note that the noise corresponding to
QBER0 in the 4-state protocol is precisely the limit above
which Bell inequality [6] can no longer be violated [7,2,3],
while for the 6-state protocol it corresponds to the opti-
mal Universal Quantum Cloning Machine [8].
The situation that results when the 4-state or the 6-
state protocol is used, and if all the parties obtain classi-
cal random variables by carrying out measurements after
each bit sent, is a special case of the more general sce-
nario of secret-key agreement by public discussion from
common information described by Maurer [9]. In this
setting, two parties Alice and Bob who are willing to
generate a secret key have access to repeated indepen-
dent realizations of (classical) random variables X and
Y , respectively, whereas an adversary Eve learns the out-
comes of a random variable Z. Let PXY Z be the joint
distribution of the three random variables. Additionally,
Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate over a noise-
less and authenticated, but otherwise completely insecure
channel. In this situation, the secret-key rate S(X ;Y ||Z)
has been defined as the maximal rate at which Alice and
Bob can generate a secret key that is equal for Alice and
Bob with overwhelming probability and about which Eve
has only a negligible amount of information (in terms of
Shannon entropy). For a detailed description of the gen-
eral scenario and the secret-key rate as well as for various
bounds on S(X ;Y ||Z), see [9–11].
A first result analyses the case when Bob’s random
variable Y provides more (Shannon-) information about
Alice’s X than Eve’s Z does (or vice versa): then this
advantage can be exploited to generate a secret key:
S(X ;Y ||Z) ≥ (6)
max {I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) , I(Y ;X)− I(Y ;Z)}
This bound follows from an earlier result by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [12]. It guarantees the possibility of secret-key
agreement using error correction and (classical) privacy
amplification whenever Bob has more information on Al-
ice’s bits than Eve. It is somewhat surprising that this
bound is not tight, in particular that secret-key agree-
ment is even be possible when the right-hand side of (6)
vanishes or is negative. However, it was shown that the
positivity of the expression on the right-hand side of (6)
is a necessary condition for the possibility of secret-key
agreement by one-way communication: whenever Alice
and Bob start in a disadvantageous situation compared
to Eve, then feedback is necessary. The corresponding
initial phase of the key-agreement protocol is then called
advantage distillation.
Let us come back to quantum cryptography and first
briefly apply the general scenario for secret-key agree-
ment to the case when Bob has more information than
Eve. This case is relatively simple since, before starting
the classical phase of the protocol, Bob has already an ad-
vantage over Eve. Hence inequality (6) guarantees that a
positive secret-key rate can be achieved using only error
correction and privacy amplification. Actually, inequal-
ity (6) provides even a lower bound on the achievable
secret-bit rate.
Next, we consider the case when Bob has less informa-
tion than Eve. This case may seem hopeless. However,
there are still two reasons to keep optimism. First, we
shall see that for QBERs not too large Alice’s and Bob’s
qubits are still entangled, hence the technique of Quan-
tum Privacy Amplification (QPA) [13] can be used. Next,
Alice and Bob can take advantage of the authenticity of
the public channel and carry out an advantage distilla-
tion protocol. We shall successively analyze these two
possibilities and show that despite their differences, the
former processing quantum information while the second
is entirely classical, both can be applied up to precisely
the same maximum QBERmax!
The qubit sent by Alice to Bob is initially maximally
entangled with another qubit that stays in Alice’s hands.
Once Bob received his qubit, Alice and Bob qubits are
in a mixed state ρAB. If ρAB is separable, then the cor-
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relation between Alice and Bob could be established by
purely local operations and classical (public) discussions,
hence there is no way for Alice and Bob to base a secret
key on this correlation. If, however, ρAB is entangled,
then it contains some quantum (i.e. non-classical) corre-
lations. If Alice and Bob have many pairs of qubits, each
in an entangled state ρAB, they can apply Quantum Pri-
vacy Amplification (also called entanglement distillation
or purification) [13]: after some local action involving
pairs of qubit pairs and some public discussion, some
qubits pairs will be more entangled at the cost that some
other qubit pairs are destroyed. Repeated use of this pro-
tocol provides Alice and Bob with qubit pairs arbitrarily
close to maximal entanglement, as would have been ob-
tained with a perfect channel. They can thus be used for
secret-key agreement.
According to the general incoherent eavesdropping
strategy (1,2) and assuming Alice prepares the qubits
in the singlet state, ρAB takes the form (in the compu-
tational basis {| 00 〉, | 01 〉, | 10 〉, | 11 〉}):
ρAB =
1
2


D 0 0 −Dcφ
0 F −Fcψ 0
0 −Fcψ F 0
−Dcφ 0 0 D

 (7)
where cψ = 〈ψ↑|ψ↓〉 and cφ = 〈φ↑|φ↓〉. Using the Peres-
Horodecki [14] separability condition, one finds that ρAB
is entangled if and only if D > Fcψ and F > Dcφ. Using
the explicit relations among F , D, cψ and cφ one obtains
the maximum QBERmax for which ρAB is entangled and
thus QPA can be applied:
for the 4− state protocol : QBERmax = 1/4 (8)
for the 6− state protocol : QBERmax = 1/3 (9)
Note that these bounds are not only valid for QPA, but
more generally for any quantum algorithm. Indeed, if the
above bounds are violated, then Alice and Bob do not
share any entanglement, hence their correlation could be
produced by public discussions.
We now discuss the case when Alice, Bob and Eve are
left with classical random variables X , Y and Z, respec-
tively, and the mutual information Bob-Alice is lower
than the Eve-Alice one. Alice and Bob can then not
achieve a secret key using only error correction and pri-
vacy amplification. Nevertheless, they can try to use an
advantage-distillation protocol. The idea is that Alice
uses her random variable X to send over the public chan-
nel an N -bit block encoding a single bit C [15]:
XN ⊕ CN := [X1 ⊕ C,X2 ⊕ C, . . . , XN ⊕ C] (10)
Bob then computes (XN ⊕CN )⊕Y N and (publicly) ac-
cepts exactly if this block is equal to either [0, 0, . . . , 0] or
[1, 1, . . . , 1], corresponding to C = 0 and C = 1, respec-
tively. In other words, Alice and Bob make use of a repeat
code of length N with only two codewords [0, 0, . . . , 0]
and [1, 1, . . . , 1]. In this way the probability that Bob ac-
cepts erroneously a bit C goes down like DN . Eve, on her
side, has to use a majority vote to guess the bit C. Hence
Bob’s information on C might be larger than Eve’s infor-
mation even in cases where Bob’s information on XN is
lower than Eve’s. The following theorem defines the pos-
sibility for Alice and Bob to achieve secret-key agreement
using classical algorithms:
Theorem 1 Secret-key agreement is possible if and only
if
D
1−D < 2
√
(1 − δ0)δ0 (11)
holds. When applied to the 4- and 6-state quantum cryp-
tography protocols [2–4] this bound corresponds exactly to
conditions (8) and (9), respectively.
Recall that δ0 is the probability that Eve guesses cor-
rectly the value of a bit received undisturbed by Bob.
Proof of Theorem 1: First, we note that the condi-
tion (11) is clearly necessary. Indeed, for a disturbance
D larger than this bound the correlations between Alice
and Bob correspond to a separable state ρAB which can
be produced without any quantum channel, simply by
public discussion.
Next, we prove that the condition (11) is also suffi-
cient. When applying the advantage distillation protocol
described above, Bob’s conditional error probability βN
when guessing the bit sent by Alice, given that he ac-
cepts, is
βN =
1
pa,N
· DN ≤
( D
1−D
)N
, (12)
where pa,N = DN + (1 − D)N is the probability that
Bob accepts the received block. It is obvious that Eve’s
optimal strategy for guessing C is to compute the block
[(C ⊕ X1) ⊕ Z1, . . . , (C ⊕ XN ) ⊕ ZN ] and guess C as 0
if at least half of the bits in this block are 0, and as 1
otherwise. Given that Bob correctly accepts, Eve’s error
probability when guessing the bit C with the optimal
strategy is lower bounded by 1/2 times the probability
that she decodes to a block with N/2 bits 0 and the same
number of 1’s. Hence we get that
γN ≥ 1
2
(
N
N/2
)
(1−δ0)N/2δN/20 ≥
k√
N
·
(
2
√
(1− δ0)δ0
)N
holds for some constant k and for sufficiently large N
by using Stirling’s formula. Note that Eve’s error prob-
ability given that Bob accepts is asymptotically equal to
her error probability given that Bob correctly accepts be-
cause Bob accepts erroneously only with asymptotically
vanishing probability, given that he accepts.
Although it is not the adversary’s ultimate goal to
guess the bits C sent by Alice, it has been shown that
the fact that βN decreases exponentially faster than
3
γN implies that for sufficiently large N , Bob has more
(Shannon-) information about the bit C than Eve (see
for example [11], [10]). Hence Alice and Bob have man-
aged to generate new random variables with the property
that Bob obtains more information about Alice’s random
bit than Eve has. Thus S(X ;Y ||Z) > 0 holds for this,
hence also for the original, situation because of the bound
(6). ✷
In conclusion, we have proven that secret-key agree-
ment using either 4-state or 6-state quantum cryptogra-
phy, assuming general incoherent eavesdropping, is pos-
sible if and only if the quantum bit error rate is lower
than that produced by the intercept-resend eavesdrop-
ping strategy (1/4 and 1/3 for the 4-state and 6-state
protocols, respectively). This limit corresponds to com-
plete disentanglement and is valid as well if Alice and
Bob use quantum information processing, like quantum
privacy amplification, as if they use classical informa-
tion processing, like advantage distillation [16]. In other
words, as long as Alice and Bob share some entanglement,
they can use either a quantum protocol or a classical pro-
tocol to extract a secret-key from this entanglement.
Quantum Privacy Amplification uses
quantum controlled-not gates, the basic building block
of quantum computers. The latter are usually thought
as fundamentally more efficient than classical computers.
In the case of quantum cryptography our results demon-
strate that the same task can be achieved with both types
of computers, but it remains to be determined whether
one method is more efficient than the other. The case of
coherent eavesdropping also remains open.
From a practical point of view it is crucial to know
the upper error rate compatible with secret-key agree-
ment. It is also important to have good estimates for the
secret-key rate S(X ;Y ||Z). Indeed, in practice one has
to optimize a compromise between high raw bit rates and
low error rates [17].
Stimulating discussions with Artur Ekert, Bruno Huttner,
Itoshi Inamori and Ueli Maurer are acknowledged. This work
was partially supported by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computer, Systems,
and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New
York, 1984), pp. 175–179; A.E. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett.
67, 661 (1991); see also the Physics World issue of March
1998.
[2] I. Cirac and N. Gisin, Phys. Lett. A 229, 1-7, 1997.
[3] C. Fuchs, N. Gisin, R.B. Griffiths, C.S. Niu and A. Peres,
Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163, 1997.
[4] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and N. Gisin, quant-ph
9807041.
[5] D. Bruss, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018, 1998.
[6] J.F. Clauser, M.A. Horne, A. Shimony and R.A. Holt,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880, 1969.
[7] N. Gisin and B. Huttner, Phys. Lett. A 228, 13-21, 1997.
[8] V. Buzˇek and M. Hillery, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1844 (1996);
N. Gisin and S. Massar, Phys. Rev. Lett. 79, 2153-2156,
1997.
[9] U. M. Maurer, Secret key agreement by public discus-
sion from common information, IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory , Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 733-742, 1993.
[10] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, Unconditionally secure key
agreement and the intrinsic conditional information, to
appear in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory ,
1999.
[11] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, Unconditionally secure secret-
key agreement and the intrinsic conditional mutual infor-
mation, Tech. Rep. 268, Department of Computer Sci-
ence, ETH Zu¨rich, May 1997.
[12] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, Broadcast channels with con-
fidential messages, IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory , Vol. IT-24, pp. 339-348, 1978.
ref. therein;
[13] D. Deutsch et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 2818, 1996; Ch.
H. Bennett et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 76, 722, 1996.
[14] A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 1413, 1996; M., R. & P.
Horodecki, Phys. Lett. A 223, 1, 1996.
[15] Note that there exist much more efficient protocols in
terms of the amount of extractable secret key. However,
since we only want to prove a qualitative possibility result
here, it is sufficient to look at this simpler protocol.
[16] Note that when the disturbance caused by Eve is so low
that she has less (Shannon) information than Bob on
the bits encoded in individual qubits, then neither quan-
tum privacy amplification nor advantage distillation is
needed, classical error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation suffice. Hence, the terminology quantum privacy
amplification is unfortunate, as it does not correspond
to classical privacy amplification, but include advantage
distillation.
[17] H. Zbinden et al., Applied Physics B 67, 743-748, 1998,
and ref. therein; G. Ribordy et al., Electron. Lett. 34,
2116-2117, 1998.
4
FIGURE CAPTIONS
Fig. 1: Eve and Bob information versus the QBER, here
plotted for incoherent eavesdropping on the 4-state protocol.
For QBERs below QBER0, Bob has more information than
Eve and secret-key agreement can be achieved using classi-
cal error correction and privacy amplification. These can, in
principle, be implemented using only 1-way communication.
The secret-key rate can be at least as large as the information
differences. For QBERs above QBER0, Bob has a disadvan-
tages with respect to Eve. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob can
apply quantum privacy amplification up to the QBER cor-
responding to the intercept-resend eavesdropping strategies,
IR4 and IR6 for the 4-state and 6-state protocols, respectively.
Alternatively, they can apply a classical protocol called ad-
vantage distillation which is effective precisely up to the same
maximal QBER IR4 and IR6. Both the quantum and the
classical protocols require then 2-way communication. Note
that for the eavesdropping strategy optimal from Eve’ Shan-
non point of view on the 4-state protocol, QBER0 correspond
precisely to the noise threshold above which Bell inequality
can no longer be violated. For the 6-state protocol a similar
relation with optimal universal quantum cloning holds [8].
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Quantum bit error rate (QBER)
